Female baboons do not raise the stakes but they give as good as they get.
We used data from four chacma baboon, Papio cynocephalus ursinus, troops, living in two populations, to test the raise the stakes (RTS) strategy of reciprocity. Female baboons did not raise the stakes either within or across grooming bouts. Instead they time-matched grooming contributions and divided grooming into short episodes. In addition, analysis of the grooming behaviour of frequently versus infrequently grooming dyads did not reveal differences in grooming patterns predicted by the RTS strategy. We suggest time constraints preclude the escalation of grooming bout length as required by RTS; the data were more consistent with a strategy of give as good as you get. However, this strategy could not explain all the patterns observed, and we conclude that biological market theory represents a more appropriate framework for investigating female grooming dynamics than dyadic games based on the iterated prisoner's dilemma. We suggest that competitive altruism among individuals acts as a market force influencing an individual's value as a grooming partner. Copyright 2000 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.